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Abstract
Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theo-
ries of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompat-
ible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this 
is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this 
problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection 
of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics 
can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those 
cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) te-
leosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color 
realism-antirealism debate.
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In a recent paper, Mendelovici (forthcoming)1 has argued that it is 
possible for representational systems to reliably misrepresent certain 
properties and that tracking theories such as teleosemantics are in-
compatible with this possibility. That incompatibility is supposed to 
highlight a significant drawback of tracking theories. In this paper I 
would like to argue that one of the most popular tracking theories, 
teleosemantics, is immune to these criticisms.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the first part, 
I outline teleosemantics and the problem of reliable misrepresen-
tation. Then, I argue that teleosemantics is compatible with most 
cases of reliable misrepresentation and that those cases teleoseman-
1 Since at the moment of writing these lines Mendelovici’s paper is only avail-
able online, I refer to the pages of the electronic version.
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tics rules out are not objectionable. In the final section I address the 
particular example of reliable misrepresentation Mendelovici has in 
mind, color anti-realism, and discuss whether teleosemantics is in-
deed committed to color realism, as she suggests.
1 Teleosemantics and reliable misrepresentation
Teleosemantics is a naturalistic theory of content.2 It is based on two 
key notions: function and sender-receiver structure.
First of all, the concept of function employed is the so called 
etiological notion, according to which functions are selected effects 
(Neander 1995). According to this approach, functions are effects of 
traits that played an important causal role in the process of selection 
of that trait. For instance, the function of kidneys is to filter wastes 
from blood, because kidneys were selected for filtering wastes. That 
was the effect that explains why organisms having kidneys were fa-
vored by natural selection.
Secondly, the sender-receiver structure is an abstract model 
employed in communication theory and signal detection theory. 
In short, a sender-receiver structure is composed of two systems, a 
sender (or ‘producer’), which takes some input and produces a state, 
and a receiver (or ‘consumer’), which takes this state as input and 
produces an effect.
Teleosemantics puts these two notions together in order to pro-
vide a naturalistic account of representation. In a nutshell, the idea 
is that representations are states that stand between two systems, a 
sender and a receiver, when they are endowed with certain etiologi-
cal functions. The function of the sender is to produce a state R (the 
representation) when another state P obtains (the representatum). The 
function of the receiver is to produce an effect (e.g. a behavior) when 
state R is tokened.
Now, a key question in the debate on naturalistic theories is what 
determines the content of the representation. What determines the 
meaning of R? The answer of mainstream teleosemantics is that R 
2 In this paper I heavily rely on Millikan’s version of teleosemantics, which is 
the most sophisticated and popular view. Nevertheless, most of the claims pre-
sented here could be easily accepted by many teleosemantic accounts.
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represents the state of affairs P that the consumer system has histori-
cally needed in order to perform its function successfully (Millikan 
1993; Papineau 1993). In other words: if we look at the evolution of 
the sender-receiver mechanism, P is the feature that was required for 
the consumer to act in a fitness-enhancing way. At the very end, the 
presence of P is what explains that the whole representational system 
exists (Neander 2012).
Let me illustrate this theory with an example. Male chicken (Gal-
lus Gallus domesticus) produce a characteristic call when they find 
food, which brings other chicken to that location (Evans and Evans 
1999). According to teleosemantics, this call is a representation and 
means something like there is food around, since (1) it stands within a 
sender-receiver structure, composed by the male chicken (sender) 
and its fellows (receiver) and (2) the presence of food is what causally 
explains that the interpreting mechanism (the fellow chicks) per-
formed their function successfully (moving to the location where the 
call is made and ingesting food). In other words: this representation-
al mechanism was useful because signs correlated with the presence 
of food usually enough. So, the presence of food is what explains the 
selection of this sender-receiver structure, and hence it is the state of 
affairs represented by the call.
Now, Mendelovici’s objection concerns what she calls ‘reliable 
misrepresentation’. In contrast to standard criticisms of naturalis-
tic theories of content such as Fodor’s (1990) misrepresentation (or 
disjunction) problem, her argument grants that teleosemantics can 
account for occasional misrepresentation (Mendelovici: 7). The ob-
jection concerns systematic or reliable misrepresentation.
In a nutshell, the idea is that a state type R reliably misrepresents 
P just in case tokens of R represent instantiations of P, most of the 
time P is not instantiated and this representational relation is some-
how robust (i.e. in similar circumstances R would still misrepresent 
instantiations of P). More precisely, Mendelovici (4) defines reliable 
misrepresentation as follows:
Reliable MisRepResentation
An organism’s representation type R reliably misrepresents some 
property P iff:
1. Some tokens of R are involved in attributive mental states 
that represent objects as having property P,
2. Most or all of the relevant objects do not have P,
3. Tokens of R do or would nonveridically represent objects as 
having P in the same types of circumstances on separate oc-
casions.
Now, Mendelovici’s argues that cases of reliable representation are 
possible but cannot be accommodated with teleosemantics. That is, 
she claims teleosemantics is incompatible with the possibility of cas-
es of reliable misrepresentation. The reason is quite simple indeed: 
since teleosemantics claims that the representational content of R 
is determined by the state that existed in the past and had a causal 
influence in the selection of the representational system, it seems to 
be committed to the usual existence of the represented state. Only 
something that existed could have had this causal influence. But if 
the represented state has usually existed in the past, then the repre-
sentation has been true most of the time. So there seems to be some 
tension between the teleosemantic view and the existence of system-
atic misrepresentation.
Mendelovici goes on to argue that this incompatibility with cases 
of reliable misrepresentation has important consequences for cer-
tain philosophical discussions, such as the color realism/anti-realism 
debate. If teleosemantics is incompatible with cases of reliable mis-
representation, then teleosemanticists cannot accept that our color 
representations are false most of the time. Consequently, Mende-
lovici concludes teleosemantics is committed to color realism. And 
that seems to be a problematic consequence because a general theory 
of representation such as teleosemantics should not be committed 
to any particular view on the realism/anti-realism debate. So the 
theory is in trouble.
I think this objection is worth exploring, not only because this 
reasoning is intuitively compelling, but also because naturalistic ac-
counts have traditionally had a hard time accounting for the possibil-
ity of misrepresentation. In what follows, however, I would like to 
argue that teleosemantics is fully compatible with the possibility of 
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most cases of reliable misrepresentation, and that those cases that 
cannot be accounted for are not problematic. In the final section, I 
will consider the relation between teleosemantics and the debate on 
color realism.
2 Accounting for reliable misrepresentation
The first part of Mendelovici’s argument tries to settle that teleose-
mantics is incompatible with a set of possible cases that involve reli-
able misrepresentation. However, I think that, as stated, Reliable 
MisRepResentation clearly fails to pin down this set of situations. In-
deed, some of the cases that abide by Reliable MisRepResentation are 
extremely common, and teleosemanticists usually recognize them 
(Millikan 1984, 1993; Neander 1995).
Cockroaches and crickets, for instance, possess a set of short ap-
pendages at the rear of their abdomen called ‘cerci’. Cerci are slender 
filiform hairs sensitive to air movements. When air moves at a high 
speed and reaches a certain threshold, a set of neurons are automati-
cally activated and cockroaches perform a range of evasive behaviors 
(Comer and Leung 2004). According to teleosemantics, this neuro-
nal activation means something like there is a predator around, since it 
is the fact that in some cases a predator was around that explains that 
the utility of this evasive behavior, and hence accounts for the selec-
tion of the mechanism. When there was no predator, this behavior 
was just a waste of time and energy. But, crucially, notice that prob-
ably most of the time cerci produce a neuronal activation and hence 
an evasive behavior when there is no predator around. That means 
that the cockroach’s neuronal states are probably false most of the 
time. That is not a problem for teleosemantics because it is still true 
that what explains the selection of the mechanism is the fact that 
there was a predator around usually enough. Natural selection only 
requires that in certain cases a trait provides a significant advantage; 
it does not require that this situation be the most common one.
This is not an isolated example. Whenever a false negative is 
much more significant than a false positive, signals will tend to be 
produced in many situations when in fact there is no threat (God-
frey-Smith 1996; Skyrms 2010). When a single false negative could 
be the last one, organisms tend to produce many false positives (Mil-
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likan 1993).
Crucially, notice that this representational system seems to fulfill 
all conditions set up in Reliable MisRepResentation. The representa-
tion R (in this case, certain neuronal activity) represents there being 
danger around (condition 1), in most cases there is no danger (condi-
tion 2) and in many similar circumstances R still misrepresents the 
presence of danger (condition 3). So cases that satisfy Reliable Mis-
RepResentation are perfectly compatible with teleosemantics.
In order for Mendelovici’s argument to have some bite, she needs 
to exclude this sort of cases, which teleosemantics trivially accounts 
for. In particular, condition 2 should be restricted to representations 
of objects that never instantiate a certain property P. That is, clause 
2 must be read as stating that ‘all of the relevant objects do not have 
P’. Indeed, that version fits much better with the particular counter-
examples Mendelovici brings forward in her paper. Let us call this 
modified definition ‘stRong Reliable MisRepResentation’.
Is teleosemantics incompatible with cases that fulfil stRong Reli-
able MisRepResentation? Probably not. We can also describe some 
scenarios in which teleosemantics can satisfactorily accommodate 
stRong Reliable MisRepResentation.
Think first about organisms which are endowed with a mecha-
nism for representing the size of objects. This mechanism will pro-
duce a different representation depending on the input it receives. 
Now, while it is extremely plausible that most of the time we repre-
sent the right size of objects, there is a vast literature in psychology 
describing cases in which this mechanism systematically yields inac-
curate representations. For instance, in the best-known version of 
the Ebbinghaus illusion, two circles of identical size are placed near 
to each other and one is surrounded by large circles while the other 
is surrounded by small circles; the first central circle then appears 
smaller than the second central circle.3 In this case, the selection 
and existence of a mechanism producing representations of size is 
explained by the fact that most of the time it produces the right rep-
3 Apparently, only the ventral pathway is mislead by this illusion; the dorso-
lateral pathway represents the size of the objects accurately (Jacob and Jeannerod 
2003). So, a better description of the case would say that there is a mechanism in 
the ventral pathway that reliably misrepresents size.
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resentations. Nevertheless, there is a representation type R (the state 
that misrepresents the size of inner circle in the Ebbinghaus scenario) 
that reliably and systematically misrepresents a certain configura-
tion. This state R, which reliably misrepresents an inexistent size of 
certain circles, is a by-product of the representational system that has 
earned its keep in evolution. This is a sort of case involving strong re-
liable misrepresentation that can be perfectly accommodated within 
teleosemantics.
There is a second way teleosemantics can account for cases of 
strong reliable misrepresentation that Mendelovici does consider (al-
though she utterly rejects this option for reasons that will become 
clear below). A given mechanism could produce P-involving repre-
sentations because the organism was confronted with instances of P 
in the evolutionary past and, nevertheless, at a certain time t, P might 
not be instantiated any more. Toads (Bufo Bufo), for instance, dart on 
any elongated object moving at a certain velocity in the direction of 
its axis (Ewert 2004). If a toad is grown up in a laboratory, where all 
the moving black things it sees are nutritious pellets, this toad will be 
consistently and reliably misrepresenting all its life. We could even 
make the case more extreme by supposing that flies go extinct, so 
that flyhood is never instantiated again. In this case, all toads will 
be reliably misrepresenting flies. Also in this case, teleosemantics 
is fully compatible with cases of strong reliable misrepresentation.
Since neither reliable misrepresentation nor strong reliable mis-
representation can do the trick, Mendelovici needs a different kind 
of example. Indeed, she suggests an additional condition that should 
also be taken into account: the strong reliable misrepresentation 
must also be stable. She suggests that a reliable representation is stable 
when it lasts for a significant period of time. Accordingly, the pro-
posal is that the sort of examples that might threaten teleosemantics 
concern cases of  strong and stable reliable misrepresentation. She 
argues that the example of toads (Bufo Bufo) does not exemplify a case 
of strong and stable reliable misrepresentation, because this sort of 
misrepresentation is unstable. Since in the laboratory nutritious pel-
lets (and not flies) help toads to survive, teleosemantics entails that 
toads will come to represent soon the presence of nutritious pellets, 
rather than the presence of flies.
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Now, the notion of stability appealed to here should be qualified 
in an important way: it is not obvious that teleosemantics cannot 
accommodate cases of strong and stable reliable misrepresentation, 
as far as this significant period of time is insufficient for evolution 
to take place. For instance, teleosemantics is compatible with an in-
dividual misrepresenting all its life (e.g. the toad in the laboratory 
discussed earlier). Unless a process of selection occurs, teleoseman-
tics can accommodate cases of strong reliable misrepresentation 
lasting for a significant period of time. And we know that within a 
given population, many years or even centuries might pass by before 
evolution takes place. So, merely adding stability to strong reliable 
misrepresentation falls short of specifying a counterexample for te-
leosemantics: the relevant case Mendelovici is after should include a 
period of time long enough for evolution to take pace.
Now, prima facie it is hard to think of any example that can satisfy 
these conditions of stability, reliability and systematic misrepresenta-
tion. Mendelovici (10) helps us by describing the particular counter-
example she has in mind. She claims that teleosemantics is incompat-
ible with the following situation: a representation type R represents a 
property P, P correlates with Q and Q (but not P) explains why dur-
ing a significant period of time the organism has acted successfully 
and why it was selected for. According to her, that would be a case 
in which R would be reliably misrepresenting Q as a P. Mendelovici 
argues this possible situation is ruled out a priori by teleosemantics. 
On teleosemantics, if instantiations of property Q explain the selec-
tion of the mechanism that produces R, then R will be representing 
Q rather than P. So teleosemantics entails that it cannot happen that 
R represents P and Q explains why R-representations have been se-
lected for.
Mendelovici’s objection, then, is that teleosemantics fails to ac-
count for cases of strong and stable reliable misrepresentation involv-
ing a process of evolution and in which the property that accounts for 
the selection of the mechanism (Q) is different from the represented 
property (P). At this point, I completely agree with Mendelovici. 
This, I think, is the only case teleosemantics cannot account for. The 
interesting question, however, is whether this example raises any 
difficulty for teleosemantics. Is this is an objectionable consequence 
of the theory?
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The answer, I think, is clearly negative. First, remember I showed 
that Mendelovici can only appeal to cases of strong and stable reliable 
misrepresentation involving a process of selection. Consequently, 
her objection is that teleosemantics is incompatible with the follow-
ing case: Q is the property that causally explains the evolutionary 
success of having a representation R, but R does not represent Q but 
P.
I agree this possibility is certainly ruled out by teleosemantics; 
according to the theory, R represents Q iff Q causally explains the 
selection of the mechanism producing R. However, that does not 
seem to be an unwelcome result, but just a different way of stating 
the theory. If R represents whatever feature explains its selection, it 
cannot happen that a feature explains its selection and it is not repre-
sented by R. Why should that be a problem?
The same point can be made in a different way. Every theory, 
teleosemantics a fortiori, is such that whatever meets the sufficient 
conditions for being an F according to a theory is an F according to 
the theory. This is just what sufficient conditions are. In teleoseman-
tics, those sufficient conditions involve a process of reliability and 
stability for a period sufficient for selection of the sender-receiver 
configuration. Consequently, it is certainly true that teleosemantics 
rules out a case in which Q is the property that accounts for the 
selection of R and R does not represent Q, but any theory giving 
sufficient conditions for being an F is incompatible with the presence 
of sufficient conditions without there being an F. Therefore, the fact 
that there is a case of reliable misrepresentation that is ruled out by 
teleosemantics should not be regarded as a problematic consequence 
of the theory. It is just a different way of formulating the key tenets 
of this approach.4
4 This response is also available to any other version of teleosemantics. For 
instance, according to Neander’s (1995) approach, content is utterly determined 
by the properties that the organism is able to discriminate. That is, on her view, 
toads represent something like there is a black moving thing. Now, certainly her 
theory excludes cases in which an organism represents M and it cannot discrimi-
nate M. That is an obvious consequence of the theory, but it is not clear why she 
should be worried about it.
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3 Metaphysical commitments of teleosemantics
I just argued that cases of reliable misrepresentation do not threaten 
teleosemantics. Nonetheless, I think there is a deep and intriguing 
issue underlying Mendelovici’s reasoning that should be addressed 
by teleosemantics. The interesting question she is trying to raise 
(which, as I will argue below, she wrongly expressed in terms of 
reliable misrepresentation) is whether teleosemantics is compatible 
with certain anti-realist positions, e.g. color eliminativism. This is 
one of the problems pointed out by Mendelovici’s paper I would like 
to turn to in the remainder.5
First of all, notice that, strictly speaking, teleosemantics as such is 
compatible with the denial of realism about any entity. For instance, 
teleosemantics can be true at a possible world w, even if no organism 
exists at w, or even if evolution has never taken place at w. What the 
theory claims is that there are representations at a world w if and only 
if certain processes occur (involving some systems, natural selection 
and so on). So teleosemantics as such has no realist implications.
Mendelovici, however, tries to put some pressure on teleoseman-
tic theories in that direction. She argues that if we accept teleose-
mantics and certain empirical claims, the theory has inadequate con-
sequences concerning the debate between realism and anti-realism. 
In particular, she claims that accepting teleosemantics ‘would force 
us to be realists about properties represented in nonsemantically 
successful conditions, where realism about property P is the view 
that P is instantiated’ (Mendelovici: 18). Now, does teleosemantics 
force us to be realist about properties represented in nonsemantically 
successful conditions? I think the answer is affirmative, but again I 
doubt granting this point results in any problematic consequence for 
5 Mendelovici (16-7) puts forward another argument, which I think can be 
easily defeated given the results of the previous discussion. First she distinguishes 
veridicality from reliability: a mechanism is veridical if it yields the right result 
and it is reliable if it tends to produce the same result, regardless of whether it 
is veridical. Her ‘psychological argument’ claims that if a theory is unable to ac-
count for reliable misrepresentation, it cannot maintain the useful distinction 
between veridicality and reliability. Now, since I have already shown that teleose-
mantics can accommodate many cases of reliable misrepresentation, it should be 
obvious that it can also make this distinction.
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the theory. Let me explain.
In teleosemantics ‘P is represented in non-semantically success-
ful conditions’ should be spell out as the claim that P was the prop-
erty that accounted for the selection of the sender-receiver system. 
Hence, the problem should be cashed out as follows: if teleoseman-
tics is right and P is the property that accounts for the existence 
and selection for the system, then one is committed to the (past) 
existence of P.6 Again, this conditional seems true, but also entirely 
plausible. If a property P accounted for the existence of the represen-
tational system, P must have been instantiated somewhere.
Indeed, this inference is not only plausible, but it describes a stan-
dard way of reasoning in science. A clear example can be found in 
research on arachnophobia (the fear of spiders and other arachnids). 
Some studies suggest that evolution might have equipped mammals 
with a strong predisposition to react fearfully to spiders (Öhman and 
Mineka 2001). One of the standard criticisms to this proposal is that 
only 0.1 percent of the 35.000 different kinds of spiders in the world 
are poisonous, so probably having a predisposition to react fearfully 
to spiders did not constitute any significant selective advantage for 
mammals (Gerdes et al. 2009). The debate, then, assumes that if 
humans possess a mechanism for producing fearful reactions to spi-
ders, then a sufficient number of poisonous spiders must have existed 
in the past. Hence, scientists accept that if we are endowed with a 
mechanism for representing or behaving towards P, then P must have 
existed in the past. That looks like an impeccable scientific reason-
ing.
Similar arguments are also common in philosophy, e.g. in rela-
tion to radical conceptual nativism (Fodor 1975, 1998). Some people 
have suggested that human concepts like CARBURETOR or TELE-
VISION cannot be innate because if they were, we would have to 
accept that there were carburetors and televisions at the time our 
ancestors evolved (Sterelny 1989; Prinz 2002: 229). Again, it is as-
sumed here that the truth of some claims about conceptual content 
6 It is worth pointing out that if teleosemantics is committed to realism about 
an entity, it is realism about an entity in the evolutionary past. As we saw, teleose-
mantics is compatible with the possibility of P-involving representations in cases 
where P has gone extinct.
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commits one to certain ontological claims.
Therefore, one should not try to devise a general argument against 
drawing metaphysical conclusions from theories of meaning and cer-
tain empirical claims about the current representational capacities 
of organisms. Many discussions in science and philosophy take for 
granted that if we have good reasons for thinking that an organism 
has build-in a mechanism for representing a set of properties P, this 
set of properties P existed in the past.
In order to make her objection to teleosemantics more compel-
ling, Mendelovici focuses on a particular case, in which this general 
way of arguing seems to go astray: color. More precisely, she argues 
that if we accept teleosemantics, the following inference could be 
carried out:
P1 I have experiences of redness.
P2 My experiences of redness at least sometimes occur in (non-
semantically) successful conditions.
P3 If I have experiences of redness in (nonsemantically) success-
ful conditions, then realism about redness is true.
____________________
C Realism about redness is true.
She claims that realism about a certain entity like colors should not 
be so easy to get, so given the strong intuitive support for P1 and 
P2, P3 (which directly derives from teleosemantics) should be aban-
doned. The objection, then, is that teleosemantics warrants certain 
inferences and conclusions in the realist debate that a theory of con-
tent should not allow.
Before directly addressing this particular version of the objec-
tion, let me clarify the first premise, which I think is unduly im-
precise. P1 could be interpreted (at least) in three different ways: 
as a claim about representational content (I have experiences about 
redness), about phenomenal properties (I have experiences instanti-
ating phenomenal redness) or about the two (I have an experience 
about redness instantiating phenomenal redness). Now, remember 
that this argument is supposed to make explicit a consequence of 
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endorsing teleosemantics and this naturalistic approach is exclusively 
concerned with representational content (see Millikan 1984, Nean-
der 2012). Teleosemantics as such is a theory of content, and it is 
silent concerning the relationship between representational content 
and phenomenal properties. Therefore, in that particular case, P1 
should be read as stating that experiences are about redness. That is, 
P1 is a claim about representational content.
Indeed, notice if P1 were interpreted as stating that experiences 
instantiate a certain phenomenal property (redness), P1-P3 would 
not entail C without additional and controversial assumptions about 
the connection between phenomenal and representational proper-
ties, which are clearly not made by teleosemanticists and would re-
quire independent support.
Having clarified premise P1, let me argue why I think Mende-
lovici is right in her formulation of the inference, but (again) teleose-
manticists can happily accept this result.
First of all, we saw that drawing certain ontological claims from a 
theory of meaning plus certain empirical claims is generally regarded 
as valid. So what is wrong with this reasoning? Some people will 
probably find this particular inference objectionable because of the 
a priori status of P1 and P2. Since P1 and P2 seem to be priori and 
C is clearly a posteriori, if we accept that P1-P3 entail C, we will be 
entitled to conclude a substantive and a posteriori claim about the 
world (color realism) from certain a priori claims and teleoseman-
tics. I think this is precisely what worries Mendelovici, since she 
thinks that P1 can be established by introspection alone, P2 is uncon-
troversial and she accuses teleosemantics of enabling one to become 
a realist about a certain entity ‘without any empirical examination of 
objects’ (Mendelovici: 17).7
7 Here is another quote where Mendelovici makes clear that her main objec-
tion concerns the fact that premises P1 and P2 are a priori while the conclusion 
is a posteriori: ‘But if tracking theories are correct, then in order to establish 
realism about a represented property P, we needn’t check the world for evidence 
of instances of P. We can instead check ourselves for nonsemantically success-
ful instances of the representation of P. (Mendelovici, forthcoming, 18; so also 
footnote 19). Nonetheless, let me point out that, at the same time, Mendelovici 
claims that she is not concerned about the a priori status of the premises (20). 
Again, if this is true, I fail to see why this inference is problematic.
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However, this is surely not warranted by teleosemantics. Tele-
osemantics is an externalist theory about content, so P1 and P2 are 
a posteriori claims through and through. What kind of property I 
am representing with a red experience and what kind of situations 
are nonsemantically successful conditions (i.e. what sort of situations 
accounted for the selection of the mechanism) are hard empirical 
questions that should be resolved by science. Consequently, even if 
teleosemantics is right, a considerable amount of empirical knowl-
edge must be gathered before anything like C can be established. 
Certainly, if we accept that color-experiences are representations (as 
they probably are) then, teleosemantics is committed to there being 
a property they are supposed to represent. However, what kind of 
entity we are committed to is something that should be discovered 
by empirical research.
Of course, if one assumes that the content of mental states can 
be discovered through introspection alone (as Mendelovici seems to 
suggest in 18), then this claim is in tension with teleosemantics. In 
general, externalist theories threaten the privileged access we seem 
to have to the content of our own mental states. But we already knew 
that externalist theories (and teleosemantics among them) are in 
tension with certain internalist intuitions, so on this interpretation 
there is nothing new about Mendelovici’s argument (see Boghossian 
1997). Furthermore, notice that if this is what the argument intends 
to show, there is no specific objection to teleosemantics or tracking 
theories: any externalist theory of content has this difficulty. Ac-
cordingly, a defense will have to come from externalism, rather than 
from teleosemantics.
Finally, let me conclude by directly addressing Mendelovici’s 
main question: if we assume teleosemantics and grant everything I 
accepted in this paper (including the inference from P1-P3 to C), is 
teleosemantics still compatible with color eliminativism? It clearly is. 
If science discovers that there is nothing our color experiences have 
been tracking, then teleosemantics has to say that the mechanism 
that produces our color experiences is not a representational mecha-
nism. That is, it is possible that color experiences are not represen-
tational states. There are many alternative evolutionary explanations 
for the existence of the mechanism: evolutionary drift, sprandels, 
and so on. Of course, I am not saying that this is an attractive view; 
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but the objection was based on the incompatibility of teleosemantics 
and color eliminativism, not on the plausibility of the latter. What 
we had to show is that accepting teleosemantics and granting the 
validity of the inference described earlier does not make teleoseman-
tics incompatible with color eliminativism.8
Finally, let me make a general comment on Mendelovici’s dialec-
tical strategy. In this paper, I have addressed the question of reliable 
misrepresentation and the question of color realism separately. But 
Mendelovici’s strategy is to use the first debate in order to conclude 
something about the second. In particular, she argues that (1) te-
leosemantics is incompatible with color-experiences reliably mis-
representing and then that (2) if color eliminativism is true, then 
color-experiences reliably misrepresent. If (1) and (2) were true, 
then teleosemantics would be incompatible with color eliminativ-
ism. However, in the first part of the paper I showed that (1) is false 
and I just presented an argument suggesting that (2) is false as well. 
According to teleosemantics, if there are no colors (if there is noth-
ing our color experiences have been tracking), then the mechanism 
producing color experiences is not a representational system and, 
consequently, color experiences are not representations. And, of 
course, if experiences do not represent anything, they cannot mis-
represent either. So, Mendelovici is wrong in assuming that the only 
way for teleosemantics to be compatible with color eliminativism 
is by accommodating reliable misrepresentation. Consequently, the 
question about reliable misrepresentation and the question about col-
or eliminativism should be clearly distinguished. This is the reason I 
have addressed (1) and (2) separately.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, I argued that teleosemantics can account for most cas-
es of reliable misrepresentation and that those particular instances 
8 Of course, I am not denying that certain views are incompatible with Tele-
osemantics. For instance, probably one cannot coherently hold at the same time 
that (1) teleosemantics is true, that (2) color experiences are representational, 
and that (3) there is nothing color experiences have been tracking in the evolu-
tionary past. However, prima facie this sort of incompatibilities do not seem to be 
a problem. Thanks to a referee for pressing me on this issue.
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that cannot be accommodated do not pose any significant problem 
for the theory. On the other hand, Mendelovici’s general objection 
against drawing ontological conclusions from a theory of content 
(plus certain empirical claims) seems to be wrong-headed. In sum, 
teleosemantics is neither threatened by cases of reliable misrepresen-
tation, nor by any metaphysical consequence of the theory.9
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